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In our own law, section 131 itself provides for seven classes of exceptions, of which subsection (1)(d) of that section is relevant. "1" and "l A" should continue in full force to the effect that if the appellant did not electrify the pumps he should he held not to have fulfilled his own side of the bargain. The sum total of this doctrine of substantial performance is that, though the contract is indivisible, so long as the promisor has performed a substantial part of his own side of the bargain, though he may not have performed precisely or fully what he had promised to perform, he is entitled to sue a promisee who has accepted what he performed on the contract, though the promisee can counter-claim or bring a cross-action for damages for the partial performance, omissions, or defects in execution. Demurrage or other expenses incurred owing to the supplier not complying with our instructions will be for the supplier's account and deducted from his invoices before payment. Packing - Prices to include all packing and boxing It is assumed that cases are non-chargeable and non-returnable unless we are otherwise informed in writing. Box 103, Apapa, and must be accompanied by the blue copy of this order. Although the expression "unless otherwise ordered by the court", in Order 27 r. Interest on a judgment debt is therefore interest after adjudication. So, to award interest on the judgment debt from the date of accrual of the cause of action, as the learned trial Judge had done, and as the Court of Appeal impliedly B thought, is a contradiction in terms; Secondly: The Act of 1934 on which Riches Case (supra) was decided deals with interest on "any debt or damages", that is interest on the chose in action - as a right - not interest on the judgment debt. The power to award interest on a judgement debt rests on a different principle. 55' it was held that evidence of an oral representation by an agent of the ship owner that the ship was to proceed direct to London was admissible to contradict the contents of the bill of lading which stated that the ship could proceed "by any route and whether directly or in directly" London. "3" and "3A") after inspection of the works and approving them, which act is clearly inconsistent with the suggestion that it was intended that the appellants should electrify the pumps, I cannot but come to the conclusion that it was not intended that Exhs. However, as a rigid application of this principle invariably led to unjust enrichment of the defendant who enjoyed some benefit from the contract without paying for it, the courts, in their desire to do justice between contracting parties, in particular to mitigate the harsh results of the rigid application of the principle - of indivisible contracts - on plaintiffs who often spent huge sums of money to perform some part of their own side of the bargain, developed the doctrine of substantial performance. Goods rejected will be returned to supplier at his own expense. Destination - The supplier will note the destination of the material. to award interest at the rate of 10% from the date of the judgment. It appears to me that for a meaningful construction of the rule, it is important to note that interest may be awarded in a case in two distinct circumstances, namely: (i) As of right: and (ii) Where there is a power conferred by statute to do so. Interest may be claimed as a right where it is contemplated by the agreement between the parties, or under a mercantile custom, or under a principle of equity such as breach of a fiduciary relationship. It begins when the court has pronounced its judgment in favour of the plaintiff. I do not think that the mere use of the words "for the time being" in section 35 of the Law is sufficient warrant for F adopting the provisions of the English Statute.
concurred, he reversed some of the findings and then the judgment of the leaned trial Judge. 1 and 1A and that these and no more were the contract documents; (ii) That the contract was not a divisible one so that the plaintiff ought to have completed performing his own side of the bargain before demanding payment: (iii) That on plaintiffs admission the contract was for electrification not for laying cables: (iv) That uncontradicted evidence of D. 1 shows that even the amount of job done was poorly executed: (v) That as on his own admission he did not complete electrification he did not substantially perform and so was not entitled to payment; and (vi) That the learned trial Judge had no jurisdiction to have awarded interest to the plaintiff from a date ante-dating the judgment The plaintiff (hereinafter called the appellant) has appealed to this court upon four grounds of appeal. "3" and "3A." This would appear to have cast serious doubts on the respondent's allegation of poor performance which only arose long after D. It is not, therefore, quite right to say it was uncontradicted. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is, however that as the contract was one in writing, it could only be varied by writing. Since the merger of law and equity by section 25(ii) of the Judicature Act, 1873, this position in equity has become position at common law. In other words, even though the substantive part of the enactment says "interest shall be paid on outstanding judgment debts at the rate of 10% per cent" - a provision which would have been construed as mandatory that provision is influenced by the opening phrase - "unless otherwise ordered by the court," which gives the court a discretion to order otherwise.
The Company cannot accept responsibility for delays in payment arising from non-compliance with this condition. The company cannot accept responsibility for delays in payment arising from non-compliance with this condition. Conditions on Reverse Side It is to be observed that each L. I shall set out only portions of the pleadings, which I consider relevant to the issues that have arisen for determination in this appeal, later in this judgment. I shall now proceed to consider these issues in the light of the written and oral submissions made on them. In other words it ignored oral agreement or variation pleaded by the appellant as well as his case that the respondent inspected the completed work, approved it and signed Exhs. To take one example, if the prevailing rate of bank interest is shown to be, say, 30%, I do not think that a court will meet the ends of justice by awarding interest at 10%. So, the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Kaduna Division, dismissing the appellant's case with costs is hereby set aside, and the judgment of the High Court, as amended, is restored.
I should mention, too, that after the contract was awarded on the 31st of October, 1977, without any limitation as to time of completion, the defendant, by a letter dated 1st February, 1978, (Exh. Now the issue of illegality of the contract is being raised in this court for the first time. "3" and "3A." Now it has not been disputed that parties to a contract may effect a variation of the contract by modifying or altering its terms by mutual agreement. But, having said so, I cannot over-emphasize the need for a court, particularly one whose decision is subject to appeal, to always give reasons why it exercises its discretion in a particular way if only because every such exercise of its discretion is subject to review. For the avoidance of doubt, judgment is hereby entered for the plaintiff/appellant in the sum of 16,000.00 (sixteen thousand Naira) with interest on the same amount at the rate of 10% per annum with effect from the 8th day of December, 1980 - the date of the High Court judgment.
The question, therefore, is whether the learned Justices were right in these conclusions. or indeed in any other State of the Federation, which regulates the award of this class of interest. it has now been dealt with by the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act of 1934.
70, at p.71:  SCNLR 189; Ekpan & Anor v Uyo (1086)3 N. As far as I am aware, there is no law in Plateau State.
"1" and "l A." For, it is clear that the purpose of pleading in a statement of claim is to give to the defendant notice of the ground of claim, so as - in keeping with the audi alteram patem rule - prevent surprise and enable him prepare his defence. 1 was issued with cables and glands and the rest of the materials were supplied by me - these include soil pipes, gear switches, clips. He was in the best position to have confirmed or denied appellant's assertions on the point. As a matter of law, when we talk about putting evidence called by either side on a balance, what ought to be compared is credible evidence usually of the same quality. Appellant testified that when he completed the work, it was inspected and approved by the Manager of the respondent who also signified his approval by signing his bills, Exhs. But it has been recognised that the whittled down by a number of exceptions. I do not therefore agree with the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal that it is an authority for the court to award interest from a date antedating the judgment, for the simple reason that there cannot, for what I have said, be a judgment debt as at that date.
As I see it if either case, as pleaded, was established, it appears to me to follow that there has been a variation or modification of the contract as described in Exhs. Appellant himself testified in chief as follows: The contract was to lay covers (sic) from the house to the pump island - five pumps at each station Later he continued: I was asked to lay cables from the bay to the pump island underground and when plaintiffs (sic) were ready they would connect the pump island with the electric cables themselves. All that he could testify to was based on the file copies of these documents and speculation as to what his company should usually do. "3" & 3A after inspection and approval (on the evidence of P. 1) are clear evidence that both parties agreed that the appellant need not electrify the pumps after laying the pipes. It isuseful to note that there is an analogous rule under the common law. "l" and "IA" and the implications of the respondent's Manager signing Exhs. Like the judgment Acts of 1838 order 27 rule 8 of the Plateau State (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1976, is a statutory authority for a court to award interest at 10% per annum on the outstanding judgment debt. So, as the contract is not ex facie illegal and the circumstances upon which the alleged illegality depends have not been pleaded and, indeed, the appellants and respondents have advanced widely divergent views on the point, it is imperative that I should not decide this case on the appellants' conjecture of the supposed illegality. A different contractor was awarded the contract for electrification. Clearly these put it across from the beginning that the contract awarded to him was for the laying of underground cables - for the petrol pumping stations. 71, at pp.79 and 81 held that no 'variation in the contract was pleaded and so evidence of the appellant on non-availability of electricity affecting performance and agreement only to lay the cable went to no issue. I shall, therefore, now examine whether the court below was right to have held, contrary to the opinion of the trial Judge, that the contract was not a divisible one. Conditions 1 and 2 envisage that the performance by the appellant had been inspected by the respondent and that as on presentation of the bills (Exhs. This is because the issue of divisibility or not would have been decided on the manifest intention of both parties, and not from the actual intention of either party or the way one of the parties appears to have understood the terms of the contract. His award was attacked in the appeal to the Court of Appeal. This was a statutory authority to award interest on judgment debt, in England. for connection and supply of electricity after wiring their premises or other structures requiring electricity. That plaintiff was not given the contract of electrification but that of laying of the cable only. As counsel on both sides devoted so much time and efforts in arguing it, I should also consider it, even if it is in the alternative. I consider this material in my consideration as to whether or not the contract is divisible. But, even if I did not so find, I would have agreed with the appellant that the contract was divisible. Finally, I shall consider the question of award of interest. relying on the provisions of Order 27 rule 8 of the High Court of Plateau State (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1976, awarded interest to the plaintiff at the rate of 10% with effect from 11th of March, 1978, "when bills were due for payment", and, so, the cause of action accrued. I believe, therefore, that the law in Nigeria with respect to this category of practice for award of interest is the common law principle and practice, as adumbrated in the case of London, Catham & Dover Railway v. Before 1900, that power derived from the Judgments Act of 1838, in England. Every judgment debt shall carry interest at the rate of four pounds per centum per annum from the time of entering up the judgment until the same shall be satisfied, and such interest may be levied under a writ of execution on such judgment debt. "1" and "l A" which describe the contract as being for: Carrying out flame proof electrification. was established by evidence, I should refer to the evidence adduced. Learned counsel probably had an eye on the provisions of section 131 of the Evidence Act. "1" and the contract sum accordingly reduced without considering the conditions at the back of Exhs. He submitted that the true test of divisibility is whether or not a lump sum is payable only upon complete performance. A divisible contract on the other hand imposes severable obligation - (Chitty on Contract (25th Edn.) para. It is from this principle that I shall now attempt to construe the provisions of Order 27 rule 8 of the Plateau State, (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1976 I shall quote the rule again. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, interest shall be paid on outstanding judgment debts at the rate of 10 per cent from the date of judgment whether or not the judgment debtor is allowed time to pay or pay by instalments. Clearly this rule, like the Judgment Act of 1838, and unlike the Act of 1934, deals with payment of "outstanding judgment debts." It has nothing to do with a claim of interest as a right either under a contract or mercantile custom or a principle of equity. 1 and l A to suggest that it, exfacie, intends any invasion of any statutory functions reserved for N. The plaintiff is also to supply Gear switches all at a cost of 16,000 (sixteen thousand naira). I should pause here to observe that neither of these contentions is precisely in terms of Exhs. Even so, the courts are concerned with the legal result of the pleaded facts: Lever Brothers V. This point is of material significance because the court below, relying on the case of Crusader insurance Co. As for which of the cases on the variation of agreement, appellant's or respondents. I must therefore reject the that as Exhibits "1,' and "1 A" are in writing, it could not be contradicted altered, added to or varied orally: that any variation thereto must also be in writing. "I" and "1A" and the signature of the bills in Exhs. I agree with the conclusion of the learned trial Judge that the contract was divisible. that he reached that conclusion solely on the ground that Awe was deleted from Exh. The argument of the learned counsel for the respondent is, however, that the contract could be divisible in the sense that separate contract sums have been allocated to each pumping station but the contract for each station indivisible per Se. In exercise of its power under that statute, a court could, whether or not interest was claimed on the writ and/or the statement of claim, award interest on the judgment debt at the rate of 4% per annum, with effect from the date of the judgment.During the negotiations the defendant made an offer - "without prejudice" - to pay 9,000 in full and final settlement of the claim. He therefore entered judgment to the plaintiff on his claim for 16,000.00 with interest at 10% with effect from 1st March 1978. In any case, the respondent cannot use its own wrong, i.e., illegality, to avoid liability. The plaintiff in accordance with the Local Purchase Order and the letter reference No.